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Abstract: We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of polit-
ical competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether
to set up an international emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported by
all countries. In the second stage, countries non-cooperatively decide on the number of
tradable or non-tradable emission allowances, depending on the type of regime. In both
stages, special interest groups try to sway the government in their favor. We find that
(i) both the choice of regime and the level of aggregate emissions only depend on the
aggregate levels of organized stakes in all countries and not on their distribution among
individual interest groups, and (ii) an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby
group may backfire by inducing a change towards the less preferred regime.
Keywords: non-cooperative climate policy, political economy, emissions trading, organi-
zation of interest groups, environmental awareness
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1 Introduction
When analyzing international (environmental) policy, we often consider individual coun-
tries to be represented by a single benevolent decision maker, e.g. a government, acting
in the best interest of the country as a whole. In this paper, we depart from this ide-
alized abstraction by assuming that each country’s decision maker is vulnerable to the
influence of national political competition. Then, international policy is governed by two
forces: (i) the influence of political competition on a national level and (ii) the interplay
of national governments on the international policy arena.
By political competition we mean that incumbent politicians do not only consider the
welfare of the general electorate (national social welfare) but are also susceptible to the
influence of lobby groups which try to sway them in their favor by providing campaign
contributions, information or simply bribes. This may give them an advantage over
their challengers at the next election and hence increases their likelihood of reelection.
Deviating from the socially optimal policy, however, leads to an alienation of voters
and decreases this likelihood. Policy-makers thus face a trade-off between maximizing
political support by interest groups and maximizing national social welfare.
On the international level, the particular environmental policy we consider is the non-
cooperative formation of an international emission permits market (Helm 2003). Our
choice for non-cooperative climate policies is twofold. On the one hand, the interna-
tional negotiations for a successor of the Kyoto Protocol1 both in December 2009 in
Copenhagen and a year later in Cancún have shown how difficult international cooper-
ation is to achieve with respect to climate change. On the other hand, Carbone et al.
(2009) have recently shown that even non-cooperative climate policies exhibit substantial
potential for greenhouse gas reductions.
Thus, we analyze the political economy of international climate policy in a framework
comprising two countries and two stages. In the first stage, governments in each country
decide whether to join an international permit market or not. If both countries agree
to form a permit market, the decision on the number of permits is taken in the second
stage. If no agreement has been reached in the first stage, governments decide upon
national emission targets in the second stage. In both stages, governments are subject to
1 In the Kyoto Protocol, which expires by the end of 2012, the industrialized countries of the world, so
called Annex B countries, committed themselves to a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2%
against 1990 levels over the period from 2008 to 2012.
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political influence by national interest groups. As a consequence, governments are sup-
posed to maximize a weighted sum of national social welfare and lobby contributions.
Social welfare in each country comprises benefits of national and environmental damage
costs of global emissions. If a permit market has been put in place, an additional term
enters the welfare function which captures the revenues from permit sales or the costs
associated with permit purchases. Within this framework, we analyze how national lob-
bying influences non-cooperative international environmental policy and if (and how)
the distribution of special interest groups affects the equilibrium outcome.
We find that the number of tradable or non-tradable emission allowances, depending
on the type of regime, is determined by the aggregate level of organized stakes in both
countries, as long as all lobby groups exhibit strictly positive contribution schedules.
This implies that for given national aggregates neither the number nor the composition
of special interest groups matters for national and international emission levels. Further,
we show that for the case of grandfathered emission permits, the influence of political
competition on the national level can be captured by politically adjusted damage func-
tions. Also the choice of regime in the first period, i.e. whether an international permits
market is set up, does not depend on the distribution of organized stakes among special
interest groups, as long as all lobby groups exhibit strictly positive contribution sched-
ules. In addition, we find that an increase in influence of a particular lobby group may
weaken the support for the interest group’s preferred regime in both countries. The rea-
son is that, although there exists a direct effect in favor of the interest group’s preferred
regime, there is also an indirect effect in both countries, due to the strategic interactions
on the international level, which may outweigh the direct effect.
Our paper combines two strands of literature. It adds to the literature on non-cooperative
international permit markets, originating in Helm (2003) and Carbone et al. (2009), by
introducing a political economy framework in the tradition of Grossman and Helpman.
While Helm (2003) and Carbone et al. (2009) assume benevolent national governments
and leave out the possibility of swaying policy-makers, the literature on special interest
groups originates from issues in international trade where stakeholders have long played
an important role in determining a country’s trade policies. In finding the equilibrium
of our game, we use the political economy approach (“common agency”) originally de-
veloped by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and extended by Grossman and Helpman in
various seminal contributions (Grossman and Helpman 1994, 1995a,b, 2002). We focus
our analysis in the second stage on “truthful” Nash equilibria, i.e. we assume that lob-
bies, at the margin, contribute according to the marginal change in their welfare induced
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by a marginal change in policy. To determine the equilibrium in the first stage, we follow
Grossman and Helpman (1995a) in their analysis of free trade agreements. In contrast
to their model setting, our model comprises a continuous policy variable in the second
stage, the number of tradable or non-tradable allowances.
There is another closely related strand of literature which examines the political economy
of tradable emission permits, in particular the question whether permits will and should
be auctioned or grandfathered in political equilibrium (Lai 2007, 2008). While Lai’s
analysis is confined to the national level, we are particularly interested in how political
competition on the national level influences international policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The following section introduces the
basic economic model and the political actors. Section 3 is concerned with the second
stage of the game in which the number of tradable or non-tradable allowances is chosen.
The decision in the first stage is analyzed in Section 4 before we discuss and generalize
our results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider two countries, indexed by i = 1, 2 and −i = {1, 2} \ i.2 In each country
i, emissions ei imply country-specific benefits from productive activities Bi(ei) with
Bi(0) = 0, B
′
i > 0 and B
′′
i < 0 for all i = 1, 2. Global emissions, E = e1+e2, cause strictly
increasing and convex country-specific damages Di(E) with Di(0) = 0 and D
′
i > 0,
D′′i ≥ 0 for all E > 0 and i = 1, 2.
2.1 Non-cooperative international climate policy
Countries may agree upon introducing an international emission permit market in which
each country i non-cooperatively decides on the amount of emission permits ωi it issues
to its domestic firms. Firms in each country need (at least) emission permits amounting
to emissions ei. The permits are traded on a perfectly competitive international permit
market at price p. As a consequence, national social welfare is given by:
W Ti (ωi, E) = Bi
(
ei(E)
)
−Di(E) + p(E) [ωi − ei(E)] . (1a)
2 All our results can be generalized to n countries in a straightforward manner.
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Due to national sovereignty, an international permit market is only introduced if both
countries are willing to participate. If this is not the case, both countries set national
emission caps ei non-cooperatively. Then, social welfare reads:
WNTi (ei, E) = Bi(ei)−Di(E) . (1b)
2.2 Political actors
We assume that each country i is represented by a government deciding on its environ-
mental policy. Governments face two consecutive decisions: (i) a binary decision whether
the respective country wants to participate in an international emission permit market
and (ii) contingent on whether an international permit market is formed the choice
of the level of issued permits or national emission caps. Governments in each country
are assumed to care about national social welfare but are also vulnerable to lobbying
contributions of special interest groups.
We assume that there are Mi interest groups in country i, which exhibit different stakes
in the elements of the social welfare function Wi.
3 The degree to which interest group
j benefits from emissions is defined as 0 ≤ βij ≤ 1, with the aggregate national level
being
∑Mi
j=1 βij = bi, whereas it suffers from damages caused by emissions to the degree
0 ≤ δij ≤ 1, with
∑Mi
j=1 δij = di. If an international permit market is set up, social
welfare (1a) encompasses a third component, the net revenues from permit trade, which
is positive if a country has lower emissions than emission permits issued. The interest
groups’ stakes in these revenues are denoted by 0 ≤ ρij ≤ 1, with
∑Mi
j=1 ρij = ri. Thus, bi
(di, ri) denotes the share of emission benefits (damage costs, net revenues from permit
sales) in country i which is under the control of organized special interest groups.
Organized interest groups in country i offer contributions to the local government in
order to sway chosen policies in their own favor. We model the two policy decisions
the governments face as a two-stage game. As a consequence, lobby groups may offer
contributions for each of the policy decisions individually. Governments in all countries
are assumed to care about the weighted sum of national social welfare and lobbying
3 Note that not necessarily all stakeholders are able to overcome the collective action problem described
by Olson (1971) and organize themselves as lobby groups. As we will see later, if not all stakes are
represented equally, a political distortion in the allocation arises due to lobbying.
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contributions:
GRi = W
R
i + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
(
C1,Rij + C
2,R
ij
)
, (2)
where R = {T,NT} denotes the type of regime (T = trading if an international emission
permit market is formed and NT = no-trading in case of national emission caps), θi the
relative weight the government in country i attaches to lobbying contributions compared
to national social welfare WRi , and C
1,R
ij and C
2,R
ij are the lobbying contributions of
lobby group j in country i in the first and second stage, respectively, contingent on the
implemented regime.
Lobby groups are assumed to maximize the total pay-off of their members, which is
the organized stakes in national social welfare URij that the lobby group j in country i
represents minus lobbying contributions in the first and second stage:
Lij = U
R
ij −
(
C1,Rij + C
2,R
ij
)
, (3)
with
UTij (ωi, E) = βijBi
(
ei(E)
)
− δijDi(E) + ρijp(E) [ωi − ei(E)] , (4a)
UNTij (ei, E) = βijBi(ei)− δijDi(E) . (4b)
Note that the definition of equations (2) and (3) implies that the chronology of events
is such that we may abstract from discounting outcomes accruing at different stages.
2.3 Structure of the game
We model the consecutive decisions on the choice of regime and the national environ-
mental policy as a non-cooperative two-stage game. In the first stage, governments of
both countries simultaneously decide whether to take part in an international emission
permit market. An international permit market only forms if both countries consent to
it. In the second stage, the governments simultaneously decide on the national environ-
mental policy, which is the amount of emission permits issued in case an international
permit market is formed in the first stage or the national emission caps otherwise.
In our model setup, two separate non-cooperative games coincide on each stage: On
the one hand, organized interest groups act non-cooperatively in choosing their contri-
5
bution schedules to influence the respective government’s policy variable. On the other
hand, countries decide non-cooperatively on international environmental policy. As a
consequence, each of the two model stages comprises a lobbying game in each country
(Grossman and Helpman 1994, 1995a).4 In the following, the complete timing of events
is outlined:
1. Regime choice
a) All organized lobby groups j in both countries i simultaneously offer a con-
tribution schedule contingent on the policy choice of the local government,
taking the contribution schedules of all other lobby groups and the decision
of the other country as given.
b) Governments in all countries simultaneously decide on whether to participate
in an international permit market. Lobby groups pay contributions contingent
on policy choice.
c) A permit market forms if the governments in both countries consent to it.
2. National emissions and allowance choices
a) Contingent on the regime which was decided in the first stage, all organized
lobby groups j in both countries i simultaneously offer a contribution schedule
contingent on the policy choice of the local government, taking the decision
of the other government as given.
b) Governments in both countries simultaneously decide on the amount of emis-
sion permits they issue (in case of an international permit market) or on na-
tional emission caps (otherwise). Lobby groups pay contributions contingent
on policy choice.
c) If an international permit market was formed in stage one, emission permits
are traded internationally.
3 The second stage: National emission and allowance choices
We solve the game by backward induction, starting with the second stage. In the second
stage, the choice of regime is already determined. In addition, the contributions C1,Rij paid
4 In line with Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995a), we assume that lobby groups offer contributions
only to the local government.
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in the first stage are sunk and do not influence the governments’ and the lobby groups’
decisions in the second stage. Depending on the type of regime chosen in the first stage,
the governments of all countries simultaneously set either national emission caps or the
level of emission permits they issue, while organized interest groups in all countries sway
the local government to choose policies in their favor by offering contribution schedules.
As outlined in Section 2.3, the second stage splits into multiple sub-stages.
We seek the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this non-cooperative game in the
second stage for truthful contribution schedules of all interest groups (Grossman and
Helpman 1994).5 Truthful contribution schedules reflect the true preferences of the lobby
groups. For any policy, lobby groups pay to the local government their gross utility URij
minus some base utility level R2,Rij , or formally
C2,Rij = max
[
0, URij −R
2,R
ij
]
, (5)
A truthful contribution schedule is always continuous and differentiable at least as long
as it is positive, as R2,Rij is a scalar and U
R
ij is twice continuously differentiable.
3.1 National emissions caps under lobby group pressure
We first assume that no international permit market has been formed in the first stage
of the game. Then, the governments of both countries set national emissions caps non-
cooperatively in the second stage while being influenced by the local organized special
interest groups.
The government of country i sets the national emission cap ei such as to maximize
GNTi (ei, E) = W
NT
i (ei, E) + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
[
C1,NTij + C
2,NT
ij (ei, E)
]
, (6)
given truthful contribution schedules (5) of the local organized interest groups and given
the national emission cap e−i of the other country.
5 In fact, there exist other schedules that support an equilibrium. However, Bernheim and Whinston
(1986) showed that lobby groups suffer no loss from playing truthful contribution schedules since
each principal’s set of best-response strategies contains a truthful contribution schedule. Furthermore,
focussing on truthful payment schedules may be justified because they are a simple device to achieve
efficiency without any player conceding his right to grab as much as she can for herself.
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Assuming strictly positive contribution schedules for all lobby groups j in both countries
i, the reaction function of government i is implicitly given by
B′i(ei)−D
′
i(E) + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
[
βijB
′
i(ei)− δijD
′
i(E)
]
= 0 , (7)
which implies
B′i(ei) =
1 + θidi
1 + θibi
D′i(E) . (8)
There exists a unique Nash equilibrium of this second stage of the game, as the following
proposition states.
Proposition 1 (Unique Nash equilibrium in national emissions caps)
For truthful and strictly positive contribution schedules of all lobby groups, there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium of the game in which all countries i = 1, 2 simultaneously set
national emissions caps ei such as to maximize (6) for given emissions e−i of the other
country.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix.
We obtain the same Nash equilibrium as in the corresponding game without lobbying
if θibi = θidi for all i = 1, 2 (although this equilibrium brings about payoffs which are
different from the case without lobbying). This either holds if all governments assign
no weight to lobbying contributions, θi = 0, or if organized and participating lobby
groups represent equally strong stakes in both components of national social welfare in
all countries, bi = di. Of course, this also includes the polar case that all citizens are
organized and thus bi = di = 1.
Equation (8) also implies that both national emissions caps ei and total emissions E only
depend on the national levels of organized stakes, bi and di, in both components of social
welfare in all countries and neither on the number nor the composition of lobby groups,
as long as all lobby groups exhibit strictly positive equilibrium contribution schedules.
In fact, by defining politically adjusted damage functions D̃i(E) as
D̃i(E) = αiDi(E) , αi ≡
1 + θidi
1 + θibi
, i = 1, 2 , (9)
we are back to the standard case without lobbying, where in equilibrium marginal ben-
efits equal marginal damages in both countries, B′i(ei) = D̃
′
i(E). The constant αi is
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determined by the exogenously given political parameters θi, bi and di and captures
the aggregate political environment of country i. The following corollary states how na-
tional and global emissions in the Nash equilibrium change dependent on these political
parameters:
Corollary 1 (Comparative statics of national emissions caps)
The following conditions hold for the levels of national emissions ei, e−i and total emis-
sions E in the Nash equilibrium:
dei
dbi
> 0 ,
de−i
dbi
< 0 ,
dE
dbi
> 0 , (10a)
dei
ddi
< 0 ,
de−i
ddi
> 0 ,
dE
ddi
< 0 , (10b)
dei
dθi
R 0 ,
de−i
dθi
⋚ 0 ,
dE
dθi
R 0 ⇔ bi R di . (10c)
The proof of Corollary 1 is given in the Appendix.
Corollary 1 states that national emissions ei of country i and also global emissions E are
higher the higher are the organized stakes in the benefits and the lower are the organized
stakes in the environmental damages in country i. An increase in θi increases national
emissions ei and total emissions E if and only if bi > di, i.e. if the share of organized
stakes is higher for benefits than for environmental damages. Moreover, emission caps
are strategic substitutes. If country i increases emission levels in response to a change in
the political parameters bi, di and θi, country −i decreases its national emission cap and
vice versa. However, the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect and the total emissions
E follow the national emission cap ei.
3.2 International permit markets under lobby group pressure
If the countries have decided to form an international permit market in the first stage
of the game, the governments of both countries non-cooperatively decide on the amount
of emission permits ωi they will issue in the second stage, which are then traded on a
perfectly competitive international permit market at price p. After trade, firms in all
countries need (at least) emission permits amounting to emissions ei.
9
3.2.1 Permit market equilibrium
In the permit market equilibrium, profit maximization in each country implies that
marginal benefits equal the permit price:
p = B′i(ei) , i = 1, 2 . (11)
This implies the well-known equi-marginal principle stating that in equilibrium the
marginal benefits of all participating countries are equal. As all marginal benefit func-
tions B′i are strictly monotonic, the inverse functions B
′−1
i exist with
ei(p) = B
′−1
i (p) , i = 1, 2 . (12)
A permit market equilibrium requires total supply of emission permits to equal total
emissions:
2
∑
i=1
ωi =
2
∑
i=1
B′−1i (p) =
2
∑
i=1
ei(p) = E . (13)
Equation (13) implicitly determines the permit price p(E) in the market equilibrium,
which is a function of the total number of issued emission allowances E. Existence and
uniqueness follow directly from the assumed properties of the benefit functions Bi.
The following lemma states some important relationships for later use:
Lemma 1
Defining ei(E) ≡ ei
(
p(E)
)
and introducing the abbreviations
φi
(
p(E)
)
≡ −
1
B′′i
(
ei(p(E))
) , Φ
(
p(E)
)
≡ φ1
(
p(E)
)
+ φ2
(
p(E)
)
, (14)
the following relationships hold:
p′(E) = −
1
Φ
(
p(E)
) < 0 , ei
′(E) =
φi
(
p(E)
)
Φ
(
p(E)
) ∈ [0, 1] . (15)
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in the Appendix.
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3.2.2 Issuance of emissions permits
If an international permit market is formed in the fist stage, both countries simultane-
ously choose the level of emission permits ωi in the second stage, taking the truthful
contribution schedules (5) and the actions ω−i of the other country as given. Thus, the
government in country i chooses ωi such as to maximize its payoff function
GTi (ωi, E) = Bi
(
ei(E)
)
−Di(E)+p(E) [ωi − ei(E)]+θi
Mi
∑
j=1
[
C1,Tij + C
2,T
ij (ωi, E)
]
, (16)
subject to equations (5), (12), (13) and given ω−i.
Considering again only strictly positive truthful contribution schedules and taking into
account that p(E) = B′i
(
ei(E)
)
, the reaction function of country i is given by
p(E)
{
(1 + θiri) + θi(bi − ri)e
′
i(E)
}
− (1 + θidi)D
′
i(E) + (1 + θiri)p
′(E)[ωi − ei(E)] = 0 ,
(17)
Under mild conditions on the benefit functions Bi, there exists a unique Nash equilib-
rium, as the following proposition states.
Proposition 2 (Unique Nash equilibrium in emissions permits levels)
For truthful and strictly positive contribution schedules of all lobby groups and φ′i(p)
sufficiently small for all i = 1, 2, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the game
in which both countries simultaneously set the level of emission permits ωi such as to
maximize (16) subject to equations (5), (12), (13) and taking the permit level ω−i of the
other country as given.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix.
The conditions φ′i(p) sufficiently small imply that the benefit functions Bi for both
countries i = 1, 2 are almost quadratic. For the remainder of the paper we assume that
φ′i(p) is so small for both countries i = 1, 2 that we may neglect the influence of e
′′
i (E) and
p′′(E) when we determine the sign of an expression. Under these conditions there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium in the second stage, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.
Again, we observe from equation (17) that the allowance choices ωi and, thus, also
national and total emissions only depend on the national levels of organized stakes bi,
di and ri and neither on the number nor the composition of lobby groups, as long as all
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lobby groups exhibit strictly positive equilibrium contribution schedules. However, by
re-writing the reaction function (17) to yield
p(E) + p′(E)[ωi − ei(E)] −
1 + θidi
1 + θiri
D′i(E) +
θi(bi − ri)
1 + θiri
p(E)e′i(E) = 0 , (18)
we find that, in contrast to the case of national emission caps, the influence of lobbying on
the equilibrium outcome can, in general, not be reduced to politically adjusted damage
functions because of the last term on the left-hand side of equation (18). In the special
case that ri = bi for both countries, this term vanishes and again, the influence of
lobbying can be solely reduced to the politically adjusted damage functions (9). In fact,
the case of ri = bi is compatible with a scenario in which the permit market revenues
(or costs) accrue solely to the stakeholders of the firms. This is the case, if firms in all
countries receive the national permit allocation for free. As this has been the case for
most trading schemes that have been implemented so far, we assume for the remainder
of this section that
βij = ρij , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . ,Mi ⇒ bi = ri , i = 1, 2 . (19)
Assumption (19) also allows for a straightforward comparison of the two regimes.
Corollary 2 (Comparative statics of permit issuance)
For ri = bi, the following conditions hold for the levels of emission allowances ωi, ω−i
and total emissions E in the Nash equilibrium:
dωi
dbi
> 0 ,
dω−i
dbi
< 0 ,
dE
dbi
> 0 , (20a)
dωi
ddi
< 0 ,
dω−i
ddi
> 0 ,
dE
ddi
< 0 , (20b)
dωi
dθi
R 0 ,
dω−i
dθi
⋚ 0 ,
dE
dθi
R 0 ⇔ bi R di . (20c)
The proof of Corollary 2 is given in the Appendix.
As in the case of national emission caps, national emission allowances ωi of country i
and also global emissions E are higher the higher are the organized stakes in the benefits
and the lower are the organized stakes in the environmental damages in country i. An
increase in θi increases national emission allowances ωi and total emissions E if and only
if bi > di, i.e. if the share of organized stakes is higher for benefits than for environmental
damages. Again, emission allowances are strategic substitutes. If country i increases its
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level of emission allowances in response to a change in the political parameters bi, di
and θi, country −i decreases its level of emission allowance and vice versa. However, the
direct effect outweighs the indirect effect, thus the change in total emissions E exhibits
the same sign as the change in national emission allowances ωi. However, the national
emission levels ei(E) in both countries always change in the same direction and follow
total emissions E, as e′i(E) > 0.
Taking into account that ri = bi (i = 1, 2) and summing up the reaction functions
(18) for both countries, we find that the equilibrium permit price equals the average
politically adjusted marginal damage:
p(E) =
1
2
[
D̃′i(E) + D̃
′
−i(E)
]
. (21)
Inserting this equation for the permit price back into the reaction function (18) yields
the straightforward generalization of Proposition 1 of Helm (2003):
ωi − ei(E) = −
1
p′(E)
{
1
2
[
D̃′i(E) + D̃
′
−i(E)
]
− D̃′i(E)
}
, (22)
implying that the country with above average politically adjusted marginal damages
buys permits from the country with below average politically adjusted marginal dam-
ages. Even if countries are economically identical, an argument for permit trading arises
whenever the countries’ political environments differ.
3.3 Global emissions with and without trading
For the special case ri = bi for i = 1, 2, also Proposition 2 of Helm (2003) carries over
in a straightforward manner. Denote the Nash equilibrium in case of national emission
caps by eNTi , E
NT , and by ωTi , E
T in case of an international permit market. Summing
up the reaction functions (8) and (18) over both countries, we obtain
B′i(e
NT
i ) +B
′
−i(e
NT
−i ) = D̃
′
i(E
NT ) + D̃′−i(E
NT ) , (23a)
B′i
(
ei(E
T )
)
+B′−i
(
e−i(E
T )
)
= D̃′i(E
T ) + D̃′−i(E
T ) . (23b)
Then, the following relationship between total emissions in the trade and no-trade regime
follows directly from D̃′′i ≥ 0:
ET R ENT ⇔ B′i
(
ei(E
NT )
)
+B′−i
(
e−i(E
NT )
)
R B′i(e
NT
i ) +B
′
−i(e
NT
−i ) . (24)
13
For quadratic benefit functions this implies that ENT > ET if the country with smaller
marginal damages also exhibits a smaller |B′′i |.
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4 The first stage: To trade or not to trade permits
Having characterized tradable and non-tradable allowance choices depending on the
political situation, we now move on to analyze the governments’ decision in the first
stage. In a first step, we analyze the governments’ payoff in both regimes. To this end,
we have to determine the contribution schedules of all organized lobby groups in all
countries. Obviously, without any political pressure in the first stage, a government
would prefer the institutional setting that yields higher payoffs in the second stage. But
as interest groups either gain or lose depending on whether an international permit
market is formed, the decision process in the first stage is also prone to be affected
by lobbies. Therefore, we analyze in a second step how political competition between
interest groups influences the formation of an international permits market. As already
mentioned above, we assume that an international permit market is introduced if and
only if both countries consent to it in the first stage. If at least one country decides
against the permit market in the first stage, all countries choose national emissions caps
in the second stage.
4.1 Second stage equilibrium contributions
Following Grossman and Helpman (1995a) who characterize equilibrium outcomes for the
viability of an international free trade agreement under political pressure, we determine
when a country takes a pressured and when it takes an unpressured stance. In order
to determine the amount of money which a lobby group is willing to contribute in the
first stage, we need to find the equilibrium utility levels of the lobby groups net of their
contributions in the second stage.
To this end, we utilize the indifference condition of the government stating that the
government must be at least equally well off if the lobby is active compared to the case
6 To see this, note that for the quadratic case, equation (24) can be written as B′′i
[
ei(E
NT )− eNTi
]
+
B′′j
[
ej(E
NT )− eNTj
]
R 0. Furthermore, ei(ENT ) − eNTi = −
[
ej(E
NT )− eNTj
]
. Then, the country
with smaller marginal damages (the permit-selling country) exhibits a higher B′′i (which is equivalent
to a lower absolute value of B′′i ) for E
NT > ET .
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when it is inactive. Depending on whether a permit market is formed in the second stage,
the following conditions hold:
WNTi (e
NT
i , E
NT ) + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
C2,NTij (e
NT
i , E
NT ) =
WNTi (e
−k
i , E
−k) + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
j 6=k
C2,NTij (e
−k
i , E
−k) ,
(25a)
W Ti (ω
T
i , E
T ) + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
C2,Tij (ω
T
i , E
T )
= W Ti (ω
−k
i , E
−k) + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
j 6=k
C2,Tij (ω
−k
i , E
−k) ,
(25b)
where equilibrium emissions and permit choices are denoted by a superscript R ∈
{NT, T} (depending on the regime) when all lobbies are active, and ω−ki , e
−k and E−k
indicate permits and emission levels that would arise if lobby group k did not offer any
contributions.
Then, the following proposition holds for the equilibrium contributions of all lobbying
groups.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium contributions in the second stage)
For truthful and strictly positive contribution schedules of all lobby groups, the equilibrium
contribution of lobby group k dependent on the choice of regime yields:
C2,NTik (e
NT
i , E
NT ) =
1
θi
[
WNTi (e
−k
i , E
−k)−WNTi (e
NT
i , E
NT )
]
(26a)
+ (bi − βik)
[
Bi(e
−k
i )−Bi(e
NT
i )
]
− (di − δik)
[
Di(E
−k)−Di(E
NT )
]
,
C2,Tik (ω
T
i , E
T ) =
1
θi
[
W Ti (ω
−k
i , E
−k)−W Ti (ω
T
i , E
T )
]
(26b)
+ (bi − βik)
[
Bi
(
ei(E
−k)
)
−Bi
(
ei(E
T )
)
]
− (di − δik)
[
Di(E
−k)−Di(E
T )
]
− (ri − ρik)
[
p(E−k)
(
ei(E
−k)− ω−ki
)
− p(ET )
(
ei(E
T )− ωTi
)
]
.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that a particular lobby group k has to compensate the government
twofold: On the one hand, it has to recompense proportionally for the loss (gain) in
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national welfare attributable to the change in emissions or issued permits levels due to
the lobby’s influence (“social welfare compensation effect”). The proportionality factor
equals 1/θi since lobby contributions enter the government’s objective function with
a weight of θi. On the other hand, lobbies have to compensate for the loss (gain) in
contributions from all other lobbies due to the change in the government’s policy choice
resulting from the lobby’s influence (“political competition effect”).7
Proposition 3 yields an important insight. In Section 3 we have seen that – assuming
truthful and strictly positive contribution schedules for all lobby groups – the equilibrium
outcome only depends on the aggregate national strength bi, di and ri of lobbying groups
but neither on their absolute number nor their composition. However, from Proposition
3 we learn that equilibrium contributions of individual lobbying groups and, thus, also
the aggregate lobbying contributions the government receives in the second stage depend
on the composition of pressure groups within each country.
4.2 Unilateral stances
Knowing the equilibrium contributions of all participating lobbies in the second stage, we
are now ready to analyze the equilibrium outcomes in the first stage. Following Grossman
and Helpman (1995a), we first examine unilateral stances. A unilateral stance of country
i is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game if the decision about the regime in
the second stage were unilaterally determined by the decision of country i’s government
in the first stage. For a unilateral stance, governments choose the regime R = {NT, T}
such as to maximize their total payoff GRi , which is given by the social welfare and the
weighted lobbying contributions in stage 1 and 2.
Denoting the governments’ payoffs minus the lobbying contributions in the first stage by
GRi0, country i’s government would oppose the formation of an international emissions
permits market if there were no lobbying in the first stage if and only if GNTi0 > G
T
i0. As
the choice of regime influences, in general, also the payoffs of all lobby groups, lobbies
have a strong incentive to offer contributions in the first stage, too. Again, contributions
must be non-negative. A lobby is willing to pay to the government in the first stage at
most as much as it gains by a change of regime in the second stage, which is given by
the difference in the lobby’s utilities between both regimes net of lobbying contributions
7 Depending on the strength and sign of these effects, a higher fragmentation among lobby groups may
cause lobbies to refrain from lobbying since contributions can turn negative. This would be equivalent
to a reduction of organized stakes. See also the discussion in Section 5.
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in the second stage. For later reference, we define
∆UNT,Tij ≡ U
NT
ij (e
NT
i , E
NT )− C2,NTij (e
NT
i , E
NT )− UTij (ω
T
i , E
T ) +C2,Tij (ω
T
i , E
T ) ,
(27a)
∆UT,NTij ≡ −∆U
NT,T
ij . (27b)
First, we examine under which conditions no contributions of all lobby groups in the first
stage is a unilateral stance. Therefore, suppose that without lobbying in the first stage
the government in country i supports regime R, i.e. GRi0 > G
R̄
i0, where R̄ = {NT, T} \R.
Suppose further that the first stage contributions of all lobbies in country i are equal to
zero. Given that all other lobby groups in country i do not contribute, not contributing
itself is a best response for lobby group j if and only if
GRi0 −G
R̄
i0 > θi∆U
R̄,R
ij . (28)
If inequality (28) holds, then no single lobby group can profitably contribute enough in
the first stage to unilaterally sway the government to change its support from regime R
to regime R̄. Thus, no contributions from all lobby groups in the first stage is a unilateral
stance if and only if condition (28) holds simultaneously for all organized lobby groups in
country i. Grossman and Helpman (1995a) call this equilibrium an unpressured unilateral
stance. The following proposition summarizes this result:
Proposition 4 (Unpressured unilateral stance)
Given that the government of country i supports regime R without lobby pressure in the
first stage, no lobbying contributions of all lobby groups is a unilateral stance if and only
if condition (28) holds simultaneously for all organized lobby groups in country i.
Second, we examine under which conditions there exists a unilateral stance with positive
lobbying contributions in the first stage, which Grossman and Helpman (1995a) call a
pressured unilateral stance. For a pressured stance the government must be indifferent
with respect to the choice of regime, i.e.,
GRi0 + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
C1,Rij = G
R̄
i0 + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
C1,R̄ij , (29)
as otherwise it would be possible for the lobby groups on the winning side to reduce
their lobbying contributions and still having their preferred regime choice being adopted.
Moreover, lobby groups on the losing side would offer their total net gain in case the
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government would adopt their preferred choice. If this were not true, the losers could
sway the government in favor of their preferred regime choice by increasing their con-
tributions. And finally, lobbies only pay positive contributions if the government adopts
their preferred choice of regime. Let SR (SR̄) be the set of lobbies which support regime
R (R̄), i.e. for all j ∈ SR (SR̄), ∆U
R,R̄
ij > (<) 0 holds. Then, a unilateral stance with
positive lobbying contributions in favor of regime R requires:
GRi0 + θi
∑
j∈SR
∆UR,R̄ij > G
R̄
i0 + θi
∑
j∈SR̄
∆U R̄,Rij . (30)
This condition states that the potential payoff the government is able to collect in the
first stage under regime R, consisting of its second-stage equilibrium payoff and the
difference in utilities of all lobbies that gain by the introduction of R, must be higher
than the potential payoff under the alternative regime. The sum of actual contributions
is determined by equation (29).
Note that condition (30) is necessary but not sufficient for a pressured stance in favor
of regime R to exist. In addition we need that
GRi0 < G
R̄
i0 + θi
∑
j∈SR̄
∆U R̄,Rij , (31)
otherwise, the supporters of regime R could refrain from positive lobbying contributions
and still their preferred regime would be adopted, and we would be back to the case of
an unpressured stance. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 5 (Pressured unilateral stance)
There exists a unilateral stance with positive lobbying contributions in favor of regime R
in country i if and only if conditions (30) and (31) hold simultaneously.
For a pressured unilateral stance only the sum of lobbying contributions of all winning
lobby groups is determined but not its distribution among individual lobby groups.
Thus, there exist, in general, a continuum of pressured unilateral stances, which differ
in individual contributions but coincide in the sum of contributions and the adopted
regime choice.8
8 Of course, each individual lobby group j will contribute at most its total utility gain ∆UR,R̄ij .
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4.3 The choice of regime
It may happen that both an unpressured and a pressured unilateral stance exist simulta-
neously. This holds if condition (28) holds for one regime R = {NT, T} and at the same
time conditions (30) and (31) hold for the same or the other regime. If, in addition,
GR̄i0 < G
R
i0 < G
R̄
i0 + θi
∑
j∈SR̄
∆U R̄,Rij , (32)
then both stances select the same regime R. Otherwise, there exists a pressured stance
in favor of regime R and an unpressured stance supporting regime R̄. As Grossman
and Helpman (1995a) pointed out, in the case of coexistence unpressured stances are
not coalition-proof, a notion introduced by Bernheim et al. (1987). Thus, allowing for
a minimum level of communication between the lobby groups eliminates unpressured
stances whenever there are also pressured stances. As a consequence, we assume that
the pressured stance prevails unless there exists only an unpressured stance.
We know from Sections 3 and 4.1 that the emission levels and the allowance choices in
both regimes only depend on the total organized stakes bi, di and ri within a country i,
but the lobby contributions and, thus, the government’s payoffs depend on the distribu-
tion of these stakes among individual lobby groups. As both governments’ payoffs and
lobby contributions in the second stage determine the unilateral stances in the first stage,
we analyze how the distribution of stakes among lobby groups within one country i may
influence the unilateral stances and the regime choice. Although the unilateral stance
may switch from pressured to unpressured or vice versa, the following proposition shows
that the selected regime remains the same.
Proposition 6 (Regime choice and distribution of organized stakes)
For truthful and strictly positive equilibrium contributions of all lobby groups in the
second stage, the choice of regime only depends on the aggregate organized stakes bi, di
and ri in both countries.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is that the necessary condition (30) for the existence of a
pressured stance does not depend on the distribution of stakes as long as the national
aggregates are constant. This implies that whenever there exists a pressured stance, the
selected regime R only depends on the national aggregates of organized stakes. However,
for a pressured stance in favor of R to exist, also the necessary condition (31) has to
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hold. In fact, this condition does depend on the distribution of organized stakes βij , δij
and ρij . But if condition (30) holds for regime R while condition (31) is violated, then
there exists an unpressured stance in favor of R. Of course, it may be that a pressured
stance in favor of regime R and an unpressured stance in favor of regime R̄ exists. But
assuming that pressured stances beat unpressured stances, as discussed above, again
regime R would be selected. In summary, condition (30), which only depends on the
aggregate organized stakes, always holds for one of the two regimes and this regime is
also the regime choice of the government (or the government is indifferent between both
regimes). Wether the selected regime is a pressured or unpressured stance, however, does
depend on the distribution of aggregate organized stakes among individual lobby groups.
Of course, also the contributions in the first stage and, thus, the government payoffs and
the net utility of the lobby groups depend on the distribution of organized stakes βij ,δij
and ρij.
4.4 International permit markets
Having established each country’s choice of regime, it is now straightforward to char-
acterize the conditions under which an international permit market is established. By
definition, an international permit market only forms if both countries consent to it, i.e.
if the trading regime is a unilateral stance in both countries. By virtue of Proposition 6,
a permit market is thus established if and only if the following condition holds for both
countries simultaneously:
GTi0 + θi
∑
j∈ST
∆UT,NTij > G
NT
i0 + θi
∑
j∈SNT
∆UNT,Tij , i = 1, 2 . (33)
Assuming again that equation (19) holds, which implies that ri = bi for both countries,
condition (33) reduces to:
∆Gi = G
T
i −G
NT
i =
[
Bi
(
ei(E
T )
)
−Bi(e
NT
i )
]
−
[
D̃i(E
T )− D̃i(E
NT )
]
+ p(ET )
[
ωTi − ei(E
T )
]
> 0 , i = 1, 2 .
(34)
As already pointed out by Proposition 4 in Helm (2003), there are three possible cases:
(i) The trading regime may lead to lower total emissions and higher payoffs for the
governments of both countries. (ii) Even if total emissions are lower with trading, an
international permit market may not be established because the government’s payoff in
one of the countries is lower with than without trading. (iii) Although total emissions
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are lower in the no-trading regime both governments may consent to an international
permit market because their payoffs with trading are higher than without.
In the following, we analyze how the likelihood for establishing an international permit
market depends on the political parameters θi, bi and di. The likelihood is not only
determined by the reaction of the home country where the political change takes place
but also by the reaction of the other country to a change in its neighbor’s political
environment, as the following corollary states.
Corollary 3 (Comparative statics of regime choice)
For ri = bi in both countries, the following conditions hold for the change in the difference
of government payoffs:
d∆Gi
di
=
dαi
di
[
Di(E
NT )−Di(E
T )
]
+
[
B′i(e
NT
i )
deNT−i
di
−B′i
(
ei(E
T )
)dωT−i
di
]
,
(35a)
d∆G−i
di
= B′−i(e
NT
−i )
deNTi
di
−B′−i
(
e−i(E
T )
)dωTi
di
, (35b)
where  ∈ {b, d, θ} denotes one of the political parameters.
The proof of Corollary 3 is given in the Appendix.
Corollary 3 says that a change in one of the political parameters in country i has a
direct effect by changing the politically adjusted damage function D̃i(E) (first term on
the right-hand side of equation 35a) and an indirect effect by changing the equilibrium
choices of emission allowances in both the trading and no-trading regimes. While the
first effect is confined to the country whose political parameter changes, the second effect
impacts on both countries. The indirect effect can have the same or a different sign in
both countries, and it can also have the same or a different sign as the direct effect for
the country subject to a change in the political parameters. As a consequence, it may
happen that while the direct effect goes in favor of the regime with lower (higher) global
emissions due to an increase (decrease) of the politically adjusted damages, the change
in ∆Gi and/or ∆G−i goes towards the regime with higher (lower) global emissions. If
the change in ∆Gi and/or ∆G−i is sufficiently strong and opposing the direct effect, we
get the counterintuitive result of the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Lobbying may backfire)
An increase in the influence of organized interest groups favoring higher (lower) global
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emissions may actually result in a decrease (increase) of global emissions.
The proof of Proposition 7 is given in the Appendix.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose the current regime is the regime with higher (lower)
global emissions. Suppose further that in country i organized interest groups in favor
of higher (lower) emissions gain influence in government i’s decision. Then there is a
direct effect of this influence on government i in favor of the regime with higher (lower)
global emissions. In addition, there is an indirect effect by increasing (decreasing) global
emissions in both regimes. The impact of this indirect effect may go in the opposite
direction of the direct effect, i.e. it may influence government j (j = i,−i) in favor
of the regime with lower (higher) global emissions, and may even outweigh the direct
effect. If the indirect effect is strong enough to change the regime choice in at least one
country this may lead to a regime change in favor of the regime with lower (higher)
global emissions. In this case, global emissions may be lower (higher) compared to the
initial regime.
5 Discussion
Within our framework of legislative lobbying, we found that both the choice of regime
in the first stage and the amount of emission allowances issued in the second stage only
hinge on the aggregate organized stakes bi, di and ri of the different components of social
welfare within a country and not on their distribution among different interest groups.
However, for this result to hold the lobbying contributions in the second stage of all lobby
groups have to be strictly positive. What would happen if we relax this assumption?
Consider a lobby group k in country i refraining from offering contributions in equilib-
rium. Then the amount of emission allowances issued in equilibrium is determined by
bi − βik, di − δik and ri − ρik instead of bi, di and ri. Thus, all our results still hold
for the adjusted aggregate stakes b̂i, d̂i and r̂i, which are the sum of βij , δij and ρij
of all lobby groups j 6= k offering strictly positive contributions. However, according
to Proposition 3, the contribution schedules offered by the lobby groups and also the
sum of contributions the government receives depend on the distribution of aggregate
organized stakes among individual interest groups. As a consequence, both the choice
of regime and the choice of emission allowances are not immune to a redistribution of
given aggregate stakes bi, di and ri among different interest groups if this redistribution
alters the adjusted aggregate stakes b̂i, d̂i and r̂i.
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For the important special case of ri = bi in both countries, we have shown that the in-
fluence of legislative lobbying can be reduced to a politically adjusted damage function.
That is, for a given αi determined by the lobbying parameters the government behaves
like a government immune to lobbying but applying the damage function αiDi(E) in-
stead of Di(E). This has an important consequence: All our results are not only restricted
to the influence of legislative lobbying, but extend to all influences that alter the gov-
ernment’s perception of the damages caused by emissions. Examples for such a change
in damage perception include not only increasing (or decreasing) environmental aware-
ness of the voters and/or the government, but also new scientific intelligence on the
harmfulness of emissions.
This also implies that the intriguing insight of Proposition 7 – that the direct effect of
a change in the politically adjusted damage function may be outweighed by the indirect
effect of the non-cooperative interaction on the international level – does not only hold
for legislative lobbying in case of ri = bi, but for any possible change in damage percep-
tion. In particular, this challenges the conventional wisdom that higher environmental
awareness leads to lower global emissions and acts as a partial remedy to failures in
the international coordination of public goods problems (e.g. Franzen 2003). Indeed, an
increase in environmental awareness in one country (which corresponds to an increase
in αi in our model framework) reduces global emissions in both regimes but may, at the
same time, induce a switch from the regime with lower to the regime with higher global
emissions. If the indirect outweighs the direct effect, then global emissions increase with
environmental awareness.9
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the non-cooperative formation of an international emission permits
market in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. We find that for
both the continuous choice of emission allowances in the second stage and the binary
choice whether an international permit market is formed only the aggregate levels of
organized stakes in each country matter and not their distribution among individual
9 A similar result arises in Endres (1997) and Endres and Finus (1998). In a coalition formation game,
increasing environmental awareness has a positive effect on the reduction targets but may also induce
smaller stable coalition sizes. Conconi (2003) finds that within a framework of international goods
trading and environmental policy lobbies may reduce their efforts for a higher domestic pollution tax
if they are aware of the associated emission leakages via international trade.
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lobby groups. In addition, an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby group
may weaken the support for the interest group’s preferred regime in both countries.
Although we found that for given national levels of organized stakes the equilibrium
outcome is independent of the number and composition of individual special interest
groups, this does not hold for equilibrium contributions and payoffs. In fact, we presume
that lobbies with the same interests exert a positive externality on each other. Then, a
higher fragmentation of such lobbies would effectively reduce equilibrium contributions
which the government is able to collect. However, the investigation of this issue is left to
future research.
In addition, our analysis has focussed on international climate policy by non-cooperative
countries. There are, however, some notable exceptions to the extreme case of non-
cooperation, one of them being the European Union which introduced a permit trading
system in 2005. Thus, another promising agenda for future research is the investigation
of cooperative international climate policies under political pressure from special interest
groups.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In the following, we show existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the no-
trade case.
(i) Existence: The maximization problem of country i is strictly concave, as
GNTi
′′
(ei) = B
′′
i (ei)−D
′′
i (E) + θi


Mi
∑
j=1
[βijB
′′
i (ei)− δijD
′′
i (E)]

 < 0 . (A.1)
Thus, for all countries i = 1, 2, the reaction function yields a unique best response
for any given choice e−i of the other country. This guarantees the existence of a Nash
equilibrium.
(ii) Uniqueness: Solving the best response functions (8) for ei and summing up over both
countries yields the following equation for the aggregate emissions E:10
E =
2
∑
i=1
B′−1i
(
1 + θidi
1 + θibi
D′i(E)
)
. (A.2)
As the left-hand side is strictly increasing and the right-hand side is strictly decreasing
in E, there exists a unique level of total emissions ENT in the Nash equilibrium. Substi-
tuting back into the reaction functions yields the unique Nash equilibrium (eNT1 , e
NT
2 ).

Proof of Corollary 1
Introducing the abbreviation
Γ = (1 + θibi)(1 + θ−id−i)B
′′
i (ei)D
′′
−i(E) + (1 + θ−ib−i)(1 + θidi)B
′′
−i(e−i)D
′′
i (E)
− (1 + θibi)(1 + θ−ib−i)B
′′
i (ei)B
′′
−i(e−i) < 0 ,
(A.3)
and applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order conditions (8) for both
countries, we derive
dei
dbi
=
θiB
′
i(ei)
[
(1 + θ−ib−i)B
′′
−i(e−i)− (1 + θ−id−i)D
′′
−i(E)
]
Γ
> 0 , (A.4a)
10 As all marginal benefit functions B′i are strictly and monotonically decreasing, the inverse functions
B′−1i exist and are also strictly and monotonically decreasing.
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de−i
dbi
=
θiB
′
i(ei)(1 + θ−id−i)D
′′
−i(E)
Γ
< 0 , (A.4b)
dE
dbi
=
dei
dbi
+
de−i
dbi
=
θiB
′
i(ei)(1 + θ−ib−i)B
′′
−i(e−i)
Γ
> 0 , (A.4c)
dei
ddi
=
−θiD
′
i(E)
[
(1 + θ−ib−i)B
′′
−i(e−i)− (1 + θ−id−i)D
′′
−i(E)
]
Γ
< 0 , (A.5a)
de−i
ddi
=
−θiD
′
i(E)(1 + θ−id−i)D
′′
−i(E)
Γ
> 0 , (A.5b)
dE
ddi
=
dei
ddi
+
de−i
ddi
=
−θiD
′
i(E)(1 + θ−ib−i)B
′′
−i(e−i)
Γ
< 0 , (A.5c)
and
dei
dθi
=
[biB
′
i(ei)− diD
′
i(E)]
[
(1 + θ−ib−i)B
′′
−i(e−i)− (1 + θ−id−i)D
′′
−i(E)
]
Γ
,
(A.6a)
de−i
dθi
=
[biB
′
i(ei)− diD
′
i(E)](1 + θ−id−i)D
′′
−i(E)
Γ
, (A.6b)
dE
dθi
=
dei
dθi
+
de−i
dθi
=
[biB
′
i(ei)− diD
′
i(E)](1 + θ−ib−i)B
′′
−i(e−i)
Γ
. (A.6c)
For the signs of equations (A.17), we re-write the first-order condition of country i to
yield:
B′i(ei)−D
′
i(E) + θi
[
biB
′
i(ei)− diD
′
i(E)
]
= 0 . (A.7)
Then,
biB
′
i(ei)− diD
′
i(E) R 0 ⇔ B
′
i(ei)−D
′
i(E) ⋚ 0 ⇔ bi R di . (A.8)

Proof of Lemma 1
Condition (13) of the permit market equilibrium implies
E −
2
∑
j=1
B′−1j (p) = 0 (A.9)
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Applying the implicit function theorem yields
p′(E) =
dp(E)
dE
= −
1
−
∑2
j=1
∂B′−1
j
(p)
∂p
=
1
∑2
j=1
1
B′′
j
(
ej(p)
)
< 0 (A.10a)
We further obtain
ei
′(p) =
dei(p)
dp
=
1
B′′i
(
ei(p)
) < 0 , (A.10b)
ei
′(E) =
dei(E)
dE
=
dei
(
p(E)
)
dp(E)
dp(E)
dE
=
1
B′′
i
(
ei(p)
)
∑2
j=1
1
B′′
j
(
ej(p)
)
∈ [0, 1] . (A.10c)
Employing the abbreviations (14) yields the stated result. 
Proof of Proposition 2
In the following, we show existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the trading
scenario.
(i) Existence: The maximization problem of country i is strictly concave, as
p′(E){(1 + θiri)[2 − e
′
i(E)] + θi(bi − ri)e
′
i(E)} − (1 + θidi)D
′′
i (E)
+ p(E)θi(bi − ri)e
′′
i (E) + (1 + θiri)p
′′(E)[ωi − ei(E)] < 0 ,
(A.11)
if e′′i (E) and p
′′(E) are sufficiently small. Thus, for all countries i = 1, 2, the reaction
function yields a unique best response for any given choice ω−i of the other countries,
which guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Uniqueness: Dividing the reaction function (17) by (1 + θiri) and summing up over
both countries yields the following condition, which holds in the Nash equilibrium:
p(E)



2 +
2
∑
j=1
θj(bj − rj)e
′
j(E)
1 + θjrj



=
2
∑
j=1
1 + θjdj
1 + θjrj
D′j(E) . (A.12)
For e′′i (E) sufficiently small, the left-hand side is strictly decreasing (note that the term in
brackets is always positive as e′i(E) ∈ [0, 1]), while the right-hand side is increasing in E.
Thus, there exists a unique level of total emission allowances ET in the Nash equilibrium.
Inserting ET back into the reaction function (17) yields the unique equilibrium allowance
choices (ωTi , ω
T
−i). 
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Proof of Corollary 2
For ri = bi the reaction function (18) of country i reduces to:
p(E) + p′(E)[ωi − ei(E)] − D̃
′
i(E) = 0 , (A.13)
where D̃i denotes the politically adjusted damage function (9). Introducing the abbre-
viations
Λ = p′(E)
[
2p′(E)− D̃′′i (E)− D̃
′′
−i(E)
]
> 0 , (A.14a)
Ω = p′(E)[1 − e′−i(E)] − D̃
′′
−i(E) + p
′′(E)[ωi − e−i(E)] < 0 , (A.14b)
and applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order conditions (A.13) for both
countries, we derive
dωi
dbi
= −
θiD̃
′′
i (E)[Ω + p
′(E)]
(1 + θibi)2Λ
> 0 , (A.15a)
dω−i
dbi
=
θiD̃
′′
i (E)Ω
(1 + θibi)2Λ
< 0 , (A.15b)
dE
dbi
=
dωi
dbi
+
dω−i
dbi
= −
θiD̃
′′
i (E)p
′(E)
(1 + θibi)2Λ
> 0 , (A.15c)
dωi
ddi
=
θiD̃
′′
i (E)[Ω + p
′(E)]
(1 + θibi)Λ
< 0 , (A.16a)
dω−i
ddi
= −
θiD̃
′′
i (E)Ω
(1 + θibi)Λ
> 0 , (A.16b)
dE
ddi
=
dωi
ddi
+
dω−i
ddi
=
θiD̃
′′
i (E)p
′(E)
(1 + θibi)Λ
< 0 , (A.16c)
and
dωi
dθi
= −
(bi − di)D̃
′′
i (E)[Ω + p
′(E)]
(1 + θibi)2Λ
R 0 ⇔ bi R di , (A.17a)
dω−i
dθi
=
(bi − di)D̃
′′
i (E)Ω
(1 + θibi)2Λ
⋚ 0 ⇔ bi R di , (A.17b)
dE
dθi
=
dωi
dθi
+
dω−i
dθi
= −
(bi − di)D̃
′′
i (E)p
′(E)
(1 + θibi)2Λ
R 0 ⇔ bi R di . (A.17c)

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Proof of Proposition 3
Given the government’s indifference conditions (25a) and (25b) (depending on whether
a permit market is formed in the second stage), we know that for all participating lobby
groups, contributions are either the difference between gross welfare and some reservation
welfare R2,Rij (which is simply a scalar) or zero:
C2,NTij (ei, E) = max[0, U
NT
ij (ei, E) −R
2,NT
ij ] , (A.18a)
C2,Tij (ωi, E) = max[0, U
T
ij (ωi, E) −R
2,T
ij ] . (A.18b)
If we assume that C2,Rij > 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,Mi and all R, we can re-write equations
(25a) and (25b) by virtue of condition (A.18b) to yield:
WNTi (e
NT
i , E
NT ) + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
j 6=k
UNTij (e
NT
i , E
NT ) + θi
[
UNTik (e
NT
i , E
NT )−R2,NTik
]
= WNTi (e
−k
i , E
−k) + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
j 6=k
UNTij (e
−k
i , E
−k) ,
(A.19a)
W Ti (ω
T
i , E
T ) + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
j 6=k
UTij (ω
T
i , E
T ) + θi
[
Uik(ω
T
i , E
T )−R2,Tik
]
= W Ti (ω
−k
i , E
−k) + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
j 6=k
UTij (ω
−k
i , E
−k) .
(A.19b)
Solving for Rki and inserting into conditions (A.18b), we obtain:
C2,NTik (e
NT
i , E
NT ) =
1
θi
[
WNTi (e
−k
i , E
−k)−WNTi (e
NT
i , E
NT )
]
+
Mi
∑
j=1
j 6=k
(
UNTij (e
−k
i , E
−k)− UNTij (e
NT
i , E
NT )
)
(A.20a)
C2,Tik (ω
T
i , E
T ) =
1
θi
[
W Ti (ω
−k
i , E
−k)−W Ti (ω
T
i , E
T )
]
+
Mi
∑
j=1
j 6=k
(
UTij (ω
−k
i , E
−k)− UTij (ω
T
i , E
T )
)
.
(A.20b)
Inserting the lobbies’ utilities functions (4b) and (4a) yields equations (26a) and (26b).
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
Proof of Proposition 6
Condition (30) is a necessary condition for a pressured stance. We can re-write this
condition to yield
GRi + θi
∑
j∈SR
∆UR,R̄ij > G
R̄
i + θi
∑
j∈SR̄
∆U R̄,Rij , (A.21a)
⇔ WRi + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
C2,Rij + θi
∑
j∈SR
[
URij − C
2,R
ij − U
R̄
ij + C
2,R̄
ij
]
> W R̄i + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
C2,R̄ij + θi
∑
j∈SR̄
[
U R̄ij − C
2,R̄
ij − U
R
ij + C
2,R
ij
]
(A.21b)
⇔ WRi + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
C2,Rij + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
[
URij −C
2,R
ij
]
> W R̄i + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
C2,R̄ij + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
[
U R̄ij − C
2,R̄
ij
]
(A.21c)
⇔ WRi + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
URij > W
R̄
i + θi
Mi
∑
j=1
U R̄ij . (A.21d)
Obviously, this condition does not depend on the distribution of organized stakes, as
welfare and the sum of the lobby groups’ (gross) utilities are determined by the aggregate
level of organized stakes bi and di. This implies that whenever there exists a pressured
stance – no matter what the distribution of organized stakes among the individual lobby
groups – the pressured stance supports regime R. However, whether a pressured stance
exists or not may well depend on the distribution, as condition (31), which also has to
hold for the existence of a pressured stance, is not immune to change in the distribution
of organized stakes. 
Proof of Proposition 7
To prove the proposition, we introduce the special case of quadratic benefit functions
and linear environmental damages:
Bi(ei) =
1
φi
ei(1−
1
2
ei), B
′
i(ei) =
1
φi
(1− ei), B
′′
i (ei) = −
1
φi
, (A.22a)
Di(E) = ǫiE, D
′
i(E) = ǫi, D
′′
i (E) = 0, (A.22b)
where φi > 0 denotes the country-specific benefit parameter, as defined in Lemma 1 and
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ǫi > 0 are the country-specific but constant marginal damages. We define the following
shortcut for politically adjusted marginal damages:
ψi = D̃
′
i(E) = αiǫi =
1 + θidi
1 + θibi
ǫi , (A.23)
and introduce the following abbreviations for the average benefit parameter and the
average politically adjusted marginal damages:
φ̄ =
1
2
(φi + φ−i) , ψ̄ =
1
2
(ψi + ψ−i) . (A.24)
Then, we obtain for the national allowance choices and the global emissions in the two
regimes:
ET = 2− φ̄(ψi − ψ−i) , E
NT = 2− φiψi − φ−iψ−i , (A.25a)
eTi = 1− φψ̄ , e
NT
i = 1− φiψi , (A.25b)
ωTi = 1 + φ−iψ̄ − 2φ̄ψi . (A.25c)
Global emissions are lower in the trade regime compared to the no-trade regime if the
country with the higher φi exhibits the lower politically adjusted marginal damages ψi:
ET R ENT ⇔ φ−i(ψ−i − ψi) R φi(ψ−i − ψi) , (A.26)
Applying these specific functional forms to Corollary 3, we derive
d∆Gi
di
=
dαi
di
[
ENT − ET
]
−
1
2
dαi
di
φiψ̄ (A.27a)
=
dαi
di
[
(φ̄− φi)ψi + (φ̄− φ−i)ψ−i
]
−
1
2
dαi
di
φiψ̄ ,
d∆G−i
di
=
dαi
di
[
eNT−i − ω
T
−i +
1
2
φ−iψ̄
]
(A.27b)
=
dαi
di
[
φi(ψ−i − ψ̄) +
1
2
φ−iψ̄
]
,
where
dαi
dbi
=
θi
1 + θibi
> 0 , (A.28a)
dαi
ddi
= −
θi(1 + θidi)
(1 + θibi)2
< 0 , (A.28b)
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dαi
dθi
=
di − bi
(1 + θibi)2
R 0⇔ di R bi . (A.28c)
We immediately observe that the indirect effect for country i may have the opposite
direction compared to the direct effect (first term in (A.27a)) and the total effect of
country i may go in the opposite direction of the total effect of country −i. Consider the
situation that ENT > ET . In this case the direct effect and the indirect effect for country
i have opposing signs. If φi and φ−i are similar, the direct effect is small and the indirect
effect may outweigh the direct effect. If, however, φi is sufficiently small compared to φ−i
the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect. If ψ−i exceeds ψi (implying that country
−i is a permit-buyer) then the total effect of country −i goes in the same direction as
the direct effect of country i. Otherwise, if ψ−i is small compared to ψi (country −i is
a permit-seller), the total effect of country −i may go in the opposite direction. If the
total effect of one or both countries goes in the opposite direction of the direct effect of
country i, then there may be a change of regime towards the regime which is less favored
by the interest group that gained influence.
For example, assume that in country i the green lobby gains momentum (i.e. di increases).
Then the direct effect goes into the direction of the regime with lower emissions, say the
trade regime. However, the indirect effect of country i goes in favor of the no-trade
regime and may even outweigh the direct effect. As a consequence, the government in
country i is less in favor of the trade regime than before the gain in influence. Also the
indirect effect in country −i may induce the government of country −i to more strongly
oppose the trading regime than before. If the initial regime was the trading regime,
the gain in influence of the green lobby in country i may now have caused the support
for the trading regime to cease in one or both of the countries. As a consequence, the
regime changes towards the no-trade regime. If the no-trading regime exhibits higher
total emissions than the trading regime (as assumed), then global emissions rise. 
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